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Background: The heads of the Global Fund and the GAVI Alliance have recently promoted the idea of an
international tiered pricing framework for medicines, despite objections from civil society groups who fear that this
would reduce the leeway for compulsory licenses and generic competition. This paper explores the extent to which
an international tiered pricing framework and the present leeway for compulsory licensing can be reconciled, using
the perspective of the right to health as defined in international human rights law.
Discussion: We explore the practical feasibility of an international tiered pricing and compulsory licensing
framework governed by the World Health Organization. We use two simple benchmarks to compare the relative
affordability of medicines for governments ? average income and burden of disease ? to illustrate how voluntary
tiered pricing practice fails to make medicines affordable enough for low and middle income countries (if
compared with the financial burden of the same medicines for high income countries), and when and where
international compulsory licenses should be issued in order to allow governments to comply with their obligations
to realize the right to health.
Summary: An international tiered pricing and compulsory licensing framework based on average income and
burden of disease could ease the tension between governments? human rights obligation to provide medicines
and governments? trade obligation to comply with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights.
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While the heads of the Global Fund and GAVI Alliance
promote the idea of a global tiered pricing framework
[1], civil society groups are asking them to abandon and
dissolve the taskforce that was created to explore and
develop this idea ? originally named the ? Blue Ribbon
Taskforce ? [2], recently renamed the ? Equitable Access
Initiative ? [3]. One of these civil society groups is Oxfam,
which until recently was a proponent of an international
tiered pricing framework [4]. Oxfam ? s position shift may* Correspondence: gooms@itg.be
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unless otherwise stated.be due to the fact that in the international tiered pricing
framework it had in mind, the pricing of patent-
protected medicines would be set by ? an international
public health body such as the WHO ? [4], while the
Equitable Access Initiative seems to rely ultimately on
voluntary discounts by patent-owning companies. For
example, Seth Berkley, the CEO of the GAVI Alliance,
writes: ? So although it is for manufacturers to set the
prices of vaccines, the tiers would act as a guide irre-
spective of whether they are multinational corporations
or developing country vaccine manufacturers ? [1].
Thus two quite different models of an international
tiered pricing framework can be imagined: one under
which prices are ultimately set by patent-owning pharma-
ceutical companies, with guidance from an internationally
agreed set of non-binding principles, the other under which
prices are set under WHO governance. Our intention forhis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Table 1 Reasonable and real discounts for Atripla
Country name GNI discount HIV prevalence discount Combined discount Merck discount
Congo, Dem. Rep. 99.486 77.273 99.883 95
Burundi 99.463 80.769 99.897 95
Malawi 99.284 97.685 99.983 95
Liberia 99.173 72.222 99.770 95
Ethiopia 99.150 80.769 99.837 95
Niger 99.128 50.000 99.564 95
Madagascar 99.038 50.000 99.519 95
Guinea 99.016 85.294 99.855 95
Eritrea 98.994 64.286 99.641 95
Uganda 98.927 96.528 99.963 95
Togo 98.882 91.379 99.904 95
Central African Republic 98.860 0.000 98.860 95
Gambia, The 98.860 80.769 99.781 95
Guinea-Bissau 98.860 93.590 99.927 95
Mozambique 98.860 97.748 99.974 95
Tanzania 98.725 95.098 99.938 95
Sierra Leone 98.703 83.333 99.784 95
Rwanda 98.658 91.379 99.884 95
Zimbabwe 98.547 98.299 99.975 95
Mali 98.524 72.222 99.590 95
Burkina Faso 98.502 75.000 99.625 95
Afghanistan 98.479 0.000 98.479 95
Nepal 98.435 16.667 98.696 95
Benin 98.323 77.273 99.619 95
Haiti 98.301 88.095 99.798 95
Chad 98.278 90.741 99.841 95
South Sudan 98.233 90.741 99.836 ?
Bangladesh 98.122 0.000 98.122 95
Comoros 98.122 88.095 99.776 95
Kenya 98.077 95.902 99.921 95
Cambodia 98.032 68.750 99.385 95
Tajikistan 98.032 16.667 98.360 92
Kyrgyz Republic 97.786 16.667 98.155 92
Senegal 97.697 50.000 98.848 95
Mauritania 97.518 37.500 98.449 95
Solomon Islands 97.473 0.000 97.473 95
Cameroon 97.384 94.444 99.855 95
Cote d? Ivoire 97.272 92.188 99.787 95
Pakistan 97.182 0.000 97.182 95
Lao PDR 97.160 16.667 97.633 95
Yemen, Rep. 97.160 0.000 97.160 95
Sao Tome and Principe 97.071 75.000 99.268 95
Zambia 96.981 98.031 99.941 95
Lesotho 96.914 98.918 99.967 95
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Nigeria 96.780 91.935 99.740 95
Sudan 96.646 0.000 96.646 95
Ghana 96.534 82.143 99.381 95
India 96.534 16.667 97.112 ?
Vietnam 96.534 37.500 97.834 92
Nicaragua 96.310 16.667 96.925 92
Uzbekistan 96.154 0.000 96.154 92
Papua New Guinea 95.997 50.000 97.999 95
Moldova 95.371 64.286 98.347 95
Honduras 95.259 50.000 97.630 95
Bolivia 95.036 16.667 95.863 92
Bhutan 94.589 0.000 94.589 95
Philippines 94.410 0.000 94.410 ?
Kiribati 94.365 0.000 94.365 95
Congo, Rep. 94.298 91.071 99.491 95
Swaziland 93.605 99.057 99.940 95
Sri Lanka 93.470 0.000 93.470 ?
Morocco 93.381 0.000 93.381 ?
Egypt, Arab Rep. 93.336 0.000 93.336 ?
Vanuatu 93.292 0.000 93.292 95
Guatemala 93.023 64.286 97.508 95
Mongolia 92.934 0.000 92.934 92
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 92.777 0.000 92.777 ?
Samoa 92.710 0.000 92.710 95
Georgia 92.643 16.667 93.869 ?
Paraguay 92.397 16.667 93.664 ?
Guyana 92.375 80.769 98.534 95
Indonesia 92.352 37.500 95.220 92
Ukraine 92.174 72.222 97.826 95
El Salvador 91.972 58.333 96.655 ?
Kosovo 91.950 0.000 91.950 ?
Timor-Leste 91.905 0.000 91.905 95
Armenia 91.682 0.000 91.682 ?
Cabo Verde 91.436 0.000 91.436 95
Albania 90.988 0.000 90.988 ?
Marshall Islands 90.966 0.000 90.966 ?
Fiji 90.809 0.000 90.809 ?
Tunisia 90.720 0.000 90.720 ?
Tonga 90.564 0.000 90.564 ?
Angola 89.758 89.130 98.887 95
Macedonia, FYR 89.669 0.000 89.669 ?
Jordan 89.557 0.000 89.557 ?
Bosnia and Herzegovina 89.378 0.000 89.378 ?
Algeria 88.775 0.000 88.775 ?
Jamaica 88.529 85.294 98.313 95
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Ecuador 88.439 58.333 95.183 ?
Thailand 88.350 77.273 97.352 ?
Serbia 88.193 0.000 88.193 ?
Turkmenistan 87.903 0.000 87.903 ?
Dominican Republic 87.768 64.286 95.632 95
Namibia 87.455 98.120 99.764 95
Tuvalu 87.366 0.000 87.366 95
China 87.209 0.000 87.209 ?
Maldives 87.142 0.000 87.142 95
Peru 86.449 37.500 91.531 ?
Iraq 86.292 0.000 86.292 ?
Azerbaijan 86.091 0.000 86.091 ?
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 85.689 0.000 85.689 95
Dominica 85.599 0.000 85.599 95
Belarus 85.398 37.500 90.874 ?
Bulgaria 84.705 0.000 84.705 ?
St. Lucia 84.593 0.000 84.593 95
Colombia 84.302 50.000 92.151 ?
Grenada 83.855 0.000 83.855 95
Montenegro 83.855 0.000 83.855 ?
South Africa 83.318 98.603 99.767 95
Botswana 82.894 98.913 99.814 95
Panama 80.970 64.286 93.204 95
Romania 80.859 0.000 80.859 ?
Mauritius 80.836 79.167 96.008 92
Suriname 80.590 77.273 95.589 95
Costa Rica 80.277 16.667 83.564 ?
Lebanon 79.450 0.000 79.450 ?
Mexico 78.444 0.000 78.444 ?
Kazakhstan 78.131 0.000 78.131 ?
Malaysia 78.041 37.500 86.276 ?
Palau 77.952 0.000 77.952 ?
Gabon 77.549 93.750 98.597 95
Turkey 75.783 0.000 75.783 ?
Brazil 73.994 0.000 73.994 ?
Seychelles 72.764 0.000 72.764 92
Hungary 72.250 0.000 72.250 ?
Venezuela, RB 72.138 58.333 88.391 ?
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Access Initiative is leaning more towards one model or
the other. Our intention is to explore the practical
feasibility of the model under which prices are set
under WHO governance, using international compul-
sory licenses as a way to make a set of ? equitable pricing ?
principles binding.Discussion
Before we explain the international tiered pricing an
compulsory licensing framework we have in mind, we
need to unpack three concepts:
 By the right to health, we mean the entitlement of
all humans to organized efforts from society that
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obligations to meet those entitlements as born by
governments and the international community, as
enshrined in international human rights law;
 By compulsory license, we mean a legally sanctioned
government action that obliges the owner of a
patent to allow another company to produce and
distribute a generic equivalent of the patent-
protected medicine;
 By tiered pricing, we mean the practice of setting
different prices for different groups of potential buyers.
The right to health
The right to health has been enshrined in several treat-
ies, but we focus on the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (Covenant) for two
reasons. Firstly, because it has been endorsed by more
states than regional human rights treaties, such as the
African Charter on Human and Peoples ? Rights; and sec-
ondly because it has a wider scope than treaties that
confirm the right to health for specific groups, like the
Convention on the Rights of the Child or the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women. The Covenant confirms ? the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health ? (article 12(1))
and it confirms that every state is obliged ? to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of? the right
to health and other rights recognized in the Covenant
(article 2(1)). The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights that was created to monitor states ? com-
pliance with the Covenant further clarified that states
? have a core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at
the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the
rights enunciated in the Covenant, including essential
primary health care ? , and that these core obligations
include at least ensuring the right of access to health
facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory
basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalized groups,
and providing essential medicines as defined by WHO
[5]. To be sure, this is about the minimum obligation,
which applies to all countries, regardless of their income
levels: the general legal obligation to realize the right to
health progressively extends beyond essential medicines
to a general duty to ensure access to all medicines that
may improve people ? s health. Finally, the Committee
clarified that ? it is particularly incumbent on States par-
ties and other actors in a position to assist, to provide
? international assistance and cooperation, especially eco-
nomic and technical ? which enable developing countries
to fulfil their core and other obligations ? [5].Compulsory licenses
To become or remain a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), states have to comply with the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) [6]. The TRIPS
Agreement obliges WTO members to adopt certain
minimum levels of intellectual property protection in
their law, national or regional, including patents for
new and innovative medicines. A patent gives its owner
exclusive rights to the patent-protected medicine: in
principle, only the patent-owner can authorize the
manufacturing or importation and the distribution of
the medicine that is protected by the patent, in the ter-
ritory covered by the patent. This can put governments
in a conflicted position: one the one hand, they have a
legal obligation to ensure the provision of the medi-
cines that people need (as discussed above); on the
other hand, they may have to grant patents on new and
innovative medicines, which gives the patent-owner an
effective monopoly (and as a result, power over the
price), unless governments use exceptional measures
as we will explain below. Governments can negotiate
the price of a medicine with the patent-owner, but have
no guarantee that such negotiations will result in
reasonable prices, especially if their home market is
relatively insignificant to the patent-holding firm. How-
ever, the exclusive rights that are attached to a patent
are not absolute: the TRIPS Agreement foresees several
exceptions, of which we will discuss only compulsory
licenses here. A compulsory license is a legally sanc-
tioned government decision that obliges the patent-
owner to provide a license to another company, allowing
that other company to manufacture a generic equivalent
of the medicine in question. That generic equivalent
can then be distributed, under a different brand name
and usually at a much cheaper price than the one set by
the patent-owner. In practice, the patent-owner does
not have to follow through and issue a license to a third
company; the compulsory license simply signals that the
patent-owner will no longer be able to oppose the
manufacturing and distribution of the generic equiva-
lent by the company appointed by the government.
Thus the ? threat ? of a possible compulsory license often
works as the ? stick behind the door ? in price negotiations
between governments and patent-owning companies. If
no agreement is reached with regard to securing lower
prices, governments can issue a compulsory license. This
tool has been used effectively by countries that have
domestic manufacturing capacity.
In countries that do not have domestic manufacturing
capacity, however, compulsory licenses have proven less
effective with regard to securing lower prices. This is
due to the fact that the reach of a compulsory license is
limited to the territory of the government that issues it.
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a compulsory license for a given medicine to a manufac-
turer based in another country, but that license has no
legal validity in that other country. So if the given medi-
cine is protected by a patent in that other country, the
manufacturer would still not be allowed to produce the
generic equivalent, even if it is for export purposes only. A
second compulsory license, issued by the government of
the country where the manufacturer is located, would
be required. And that is difficult because of TRIPS
Agreement requirement that compulsory licensing be
? predominantly for the supply of the domestic market? [6].
The public outrage created by some excessively strin-
gent interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement forced the
WTO to adopt, in Doha in 2001, a Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which confirmed
that ? the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent Members from taking measures to protect pub-
lic health ? , and that every state ? has the right to grant
compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted ? [7]. The
Doha Declaration also called for a solution to the prob-
lem explained above: the requirement that compulsory
licensing be ? predominantly for the supply of the domes-
tic market, ? which particularly affects least developed
countries without local manufacturing capacity. As a
result, the WTO General Council released a decision in
August 2003, waiving the ? for domestic purposes only ?
requirement, thus permitting developing countries to
import generic medicines produced under compulsory
licenses issued for export purposes [8]. This decision
was formalized in December 2005 and will ? if ratified
by a sufficient number of WTO members ? create a spe-
cial compulsory license system in which an importing
country would notify the WTO of its intention to use
the system, while the exporting country would grant a
compulsory license to export pharmaceuticals to the
country in question [9]. Until then ? the deadline for
ratification has been extended until December 2015 ?
the August 2003 waiver remains valid.
So far, this special compulsory license regime in the
making has only been used once in 2007, when a Canadian
generic manufacturer obtained permission to export
antiretroviral medicines to Rwanda. The manufacturer
made only two shipments of drugs to Rwanda over a six
year period and declined to renew the license because
of the complexity, cost and limited duration of the
license [10]. Legislative efforts to streamline the licensing
process were voted down twice in Canadian parliament, at
least in part because of pharmaceutical industry opposition
[11]. Furthermore, this special compulsory license regime
limits the competition between potential generic manufac-
turers to those based in countries that issue compulsory
licenses, and thus has only limited effect on market prices.Tiered pricing
In essence, tiered pricing indicates the practice of setting
different prices for different groups ? tiers ? of potential
buyers or national markets. As an illustration of this
practice, McDonalds sets different prices for hamburgers
sold in New York and in Johannesburg. In theory, tiered
pricing is completely unrelated to patent protection
and compulsory licenses. When a company applies for
a patent, the outcome of that application does not de-
pend on whether or not the company commits to tiered
pricing. And when a government is in a position to issue a
compulsory license, the commitment of the patent-owner
to tiered pricing ? or the absence thereof ? does not affect
the right of the government to issue a compulsory license.
Yet when tiered pricing is discussed in the context of
medicines, it is usually presented as an alternative for,
or a correction to, the present intellectual property
regime for medicines. The idea is that tiered pricing in
accordance with a widely endorsed set of principles
would provide a middle ground between prices arbitrar-
ily set by patent-owning companies, and compulsory
licenses arbitrarily issued by governments [12].
An international tiered pricing and compulsory licensing
framework
For compulsory licenses to have the same ? stick behind
the door effect ? on price negotiations in countries with-
out domestic manufacturing capacity ? as they have in
countries with domestic manufacturing capacity ? they
should have an international reach. We suggest that an
international tiered pricing and compulsory licensing
framework could be created through a convention in
accordance with article 19 of the WHO constitution.
According to article 19, the WHA ? shall have authority
to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any
matter within the competence of the Organization ? , and
? [a] two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be
required for the adoption of such conventions or agree-
ments, which shall come into force for each Member
when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional
processes ? [13]. At present, a two thirds vote means 130
members out of 194 members. It is possible therefore
that a WHO Convention on International Tiered Pricing
and Compulsory Licensing (Convention) could lay out
the principles needed to calculate ? reasonable? prices for
patent-protected medicines. This Convention would not
have the power to impose these prices upon patent-
owning companies directly, but it could do so indirectly,
by promoting and facilitating ? international compulsory
licensing ? whenever a patent-owner charges prices above
the reasonable level. The Convention as we imagine it
would appoint a panel that could issue international
compulsory licenses upon the request of governments
that were unable to negotiate reasonable prices with the
Ooms et al. BMC International Health and Human Rights 2014, 14:37 Page 7 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/14/37patent-owning companies. This would go a long way to
solving the problems faced in the Canada and Rwanda
example detailed above. Once issued, these compulsory
licenses would be considered valid in all counties that
have ratified the Convention, which would allow all
companies with manufacturing capacity for the medi-
cine in question to submit a bid to the government that
successfully requested the international compulsory
license ? thus creating competition between all com-
panies with manufacturing capacity for the medicine in
question that are based in one of the countries that
ratified the Convention. Once the purchasing country
made its choice, the government of the country where
the manufacturer is based would issue a final compul-
sory license, to satisfy the WTO requirement that the
exporting country grant a compulsory license to export
pharmaceuticals (but that would be a mere formality).
To make our suggestion less abstract, we considered a
very rudimentary set of principles, based on two criteria
often used in tiered pricing debates: GNI per capita and
burden of disease [12]. (Obviously, more sophisticated
set of principles could and probably should be developed
and included in the Convention.) We then applied these
principles to one particular medicine: Atripla, which is
considered as the ideal first line antiretroviral therapy
for developing countries, but still not used as such in
many countries because of the price [14]. Based on its
desirability and pricing, we can assume that the Global
Fund will make access to this medicine a priority for the
Equitable Access Initiative. Furthermore, since Atripla is
a medicine for people living with AIDS, and reliable
HIV/AIDS prevalence data are easy to find, the drug is
a good candidate for our exercise ? which is merely an
illustration, not a comprehensive analysis. According to
the 2013 ?Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price
Reductions ? report of M?decins Sans Fronti?res, Merck
sells Atripla at US$613 per person per year to several
?Category 1? developing countries, and at $1,003 per person
per year to a few ?Category 2? developing countries [15].
The cheapest generic equivalent costs $158 per person
per year. Which of these prices is the most ? reasonable ? ?
To answer the question, we first looked up the price
for Altripla in Belgium: ? 822.17 for 30 days [16], which
makes ? 10,003 per year, or $12,530 per year. Thus in
comparison to Belgium, ?Category 2 ? countries receive a
92% discount, while ?Category 1? countries receive a 95%
discount. The cheapest generic equivalent results in a
99% ? discount ? .
Then we considered that all developing countries
should receive a first discount based on their Gross
National Income (GNI) per capita, because the GNI per
capita provides an approximation of potential govern-
ment revenue, and therefore of potential government
ability to purchase and distribute or subsidize medicines.For example, if the GNI per capita of Brazil is $11,630,
while the GNI per capita of Belgium is $44,720, according
to World Bank data [17], the ability of the Government of
Brazil to purchase or subsidize Atripla (and other medi-
cines) is considered to be at 26% of the ability of the
Government of Belgium, and we assumed that Brazil
ought to receive a first discount of 74%. (According to
the 2013 ?Untangling the Web of Antiretroviral Price
Reductions ? report of M?decins Sans Fronti?res, the
Government of Brazil receives no systematic discount:
it is neither a ?Category 1 ? nor a ?Category 2 ? country for
Merck.)
Then we considered that all developing countries
should receive a second discount in accordance with
the prevalence of the disease for which the medicine is
needed ? in this case, adult HIV prevalence. The justifi-
cation for this second discount is again based on coun-
tries ? ability to pay for medicines: at equal potential
government revenue, a country that has to provide
AIDS treatment to 10 out of 100 inhabitants can afford
to pay ? per patient ? only 10% of what a country that
has to provide AIDS treatment to 1 out of 100 inha-
bitants can pay. The first country therefore ought to
receive an additional 90% discount. Again we looked at
World Bank data [17], except for the reference country
(Belgium) because the World Bank database does not in-
clude an HIV prevalence estimate for Belgium. According
to the epidemiological factsheet generated by the UNAIDS
website, the adult HIV prevalence in Belgium is 0.25%
[18]. For countries for which the World Bank database
does not include an estimate of adult HIV prevalence,
we assumed ? for the sake of this exercise ? that HIV
prevalence is not significantly high enough to warrant
an additional discount.
According to our estimates, represented in Table 1, only
13 out of the 127 developing countries we included receive
a ? reasonable? discount from Merck: a discount that results
in a financial burden that does not exceed the financial
burden on the Government of Belgium if we take GNI per
capita and adult HIV prevalence into account. These
countries are: Bhutan, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Samoa, Timor-
Leste, Cabo Verde, Tuvalu, Maldives, St Vincent and the
Grenadines, Dominica, St Lucia, Grenada, Panama, and
The Seychelles. Under the Convention proposed here, they
could still issue a (domestic) compulsory license but
would not obtain an international compulsory license.
The other 114 countries could, under the Convention
proposed here, apply for an international compulsory
license. A panel of experts under WHO governance
would verify GNI and HIV prevalence data, and perhaps
give Merck a final chance to adjust its tiered pricing in
accordance with the principles of the Convention. If that
were unsuccessful the panel would issue an international
compulsory license.
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a 99% ? discount ?, even that would not be sufficient for 39
countries: they would need additional assistance ? from
the Global Fund, for example.
Most of the other 75 countries (out of the 114 countries
for which the present Merck discount is insufficient) could
pay the price of the cheapest generic equivalent without
facing a higher relative financial burden than the Govern-
ment of Belgium; some could even pay up to four times
the cost of the cheapest generic equivalent without facing
a higher relative financial burden than the Government of
Belgium. Mauritius, for example, would according to our
estimates be able to pay 4% of the price for Belgium but
receives only a 92% discount (instead of a 96% discount).
If the Convention panel would issue an international com-
pulsory license for Mauritius (or another country in a
similar situation), it could stipulate that some royalties
would have to be paid.
So far, our proposal was based on the assumption that
the price for Belgium is indeed reasonable, and can be
used to calculate reasonable tiered pricing for developing
countries, which may not be the case for all new medi-
cines [19]. The Convention could also allow the panel to
use, at times, a ? cost-based yardstick approach ? [20]: de-
manding information about the real cost of a medicine,
setting a reasonable reference price for high income
countries, then calculating reasonable prices for middle
and low income countries accordingly. Thus even high
income countries could benefit from this Convention,
which may increase the likelihood of obtaining 130 votes
in favor at the WHA.
Finally, we would argue, in line with Elliott, that ? fa-
cilitating compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals ? is, in
the given circumstances, a matter of legal obligation
under article 2(1): states are indeed obliged ? to take
steps, individually and through international assistance
and co-operation, especially economic and technical ? , to
realize the right to health, and facilitating compulsory li-
censing for countries that needed it is but one of these
steps [21].
Summary
In summary, we would argue that Berkley? s assumption,
according to which ? it is for manufacturers to set the
prices of vaccines [and medicines] ? [1], is made too
hastily. This assumption is probably based on thinking
that no technical solution can be found within the
present scope of the international intellectual property
regime that could force patent-owners to accept guide-
lines set by international organizations. But as we dem-
onstrated here, there is a solution, and a relatively
simple one too. What it takes is the political will of
WHO and 130 of its member states. Whether this polit-
ical will exists is food for a different debate.Abbreviations
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